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We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive
agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether
to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are
based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether
the actual attendance is above or below L. For L ∼ N/2, the
game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang’s
minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean atten-
dances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The
corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are
very different. This grouping effect results from the dynami-
cal feedback governing the game’s time-evolution, and is not
reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex adaptive systems [1] have been the subject of
much recent attention. These systems typically exhibit
rich global behaviour which cannot be straightforwardly
deduced from the microscopic details of the constituent
objects (agents). Fascinating self-organized phenomena
[2] have been observed or discussed for a wide range of
systems such as sandpiles, traffic flow, financial markets
and other social phenomena. Within the physics com-
munity, moreover, many ‘microscopic’ economics-based
models have been proposed [3–5] in the growing subfield
of ‘econophysics’.
Challet and Zhang [6] recently introduced a simple mi-
nority game in which agents repeatedly compete to be in
the minority group. These agents have similar capabili-
ties and each of them makes decisions based on the past
history of outcomes. Further work on the basic minority
game is presented in Refs. [7–11]. While the minority
game is stated in terms of agents choosing between two
rooms, the model can be stated in different ways to fit
different situations; for example, the agents may as well
be deciding whether to buy or sell a certain stock in a
simple market model. A more general version of the mi-
nority game, namely the bar-attendance model [12] in
which agents decide whether to attend a bar with a cer-
tain seating capacity, has also been studied recently [13].
In this paper, we generalize the minority game to the
case of arbitrary cutoff. There are N agents, each of
whom possesses s strategies, deciding whether to attend a
bar with a seating capacity, i.e. cutoff, equal to L. Good
(bad) decisions correspond to attending an undercrowded
(overcrowded) bar, or not attending an overcrowded (un-
dercrowded) room. The only information given to the
agents after each turn is whether the actual attendance
was above or below the cutoff. We present extensive nu-
merical results for the mean attendances and correspond-
ing standard deviations as a function of the agents’ ca-
pabilities and the cutoff L. For L = N/2, the game
reduces to the minority game [6–11]. The present model
for L 6= N/2 thus represents an intermediate model be-
tween the minority game [6–11] and the bar-attendance
model [12,13]: it allows for arbitrary cutoff as in the bar-
attendance model, but the actual attendances are not
announced as in the minority game. As L is reduced be-
low N/2, the mean attendances and standard deviations
tend to be distributed into two groups of values for differ-
ent runs of the same game. One group comprises a mean
attendance which is insensitive to the agents’ capabilities,
and is accompanied by a small standard deviation of at-
tendance. The other group contains a spread in mean
attendances, each with a larger corresponding standard
deviation. An explanation of these features is given.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, the game
with arbitrary cutoff is defined. Results for the mean
attendances and standard deviations for different cutoff
L, and for different number of strategies s per agent,
are presented and discussed in Sec. III. The relationship
between games with cutoff L and L′ = N − L is also
discussed. Section IV summarizes our main findings.
II. THE GENERALIZED MINORITY GAME
Consider a game with N agents deciding whether to
go to a bar with a seating capacity of L. Let the ac-
tual attendance at the bar in the n-th turn be An. If
An ≤ L , the outcome, which is the only information
made known to all agents, is the signal ‘undercrowded’.
In contrast, if An > L then the outcome is the signal
‘overcrowded’. Hence, the outcome can be represented
by a string of zeros (representing, say, ‘undercrowded’)
1
and ones (representing ‘overcrowded’). The value of the
cutoff L is not announced. The agents are not allowed
to communicate among themselves. They interact with
each other through the common knowledge of the past
history of outcomes, and the fact that each agent’s deci-
sion is influencing the others’ chances of being right. All
agents are assumed to have the same level of capability
and to decide the next move based on the most recent m
outcomes. The strategy space, therefore, consists of a to-
tal of 22
m
strategies, analogous to the minority game [6].
At the beginning of the game, each agent randomly picks
s strategies from the pool of strategies, with repetitions
allowed during picking. Each agent uses his best strategy
in making the next decision, i.e. he uses the one with the
highest accumulated merit points. The merit points are
assigned in the following way. After the outcome in a
turn is announced, every agent assigns a point to each of
his strategies which would have made the correct deci-
sion. The correct decisions are attending (not attending)
the room with the outcome being ‘undercrowded’ (‘over-
crowded’). The incorrect decisions are attending (not at-
tending) the room with the outcome being ‘overcrowded’
(‘undercrowded’). The original minority game [6] thus
corresponds to having an odd value of N , and setting
L = N/2. We emphasize that our generalized model is
different from the El Farol bar-attendance model [13] in
that the only publicly-available information is whether
the actual attendance is above or below the cutoff, i.e.
the outcome is a binary digit instead of the actual at-
tendance. This generalized model may be relevant to
some situations arising in trading in real markets. For
example, when many agents are buying the same stock,
the price will go up and the majority can then benefit.
In this case, the relevant cutoff will be larger than N/2.
Alternatively, L may represent some underlying ‘funda-
mental’ value of a particular market.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We have performed numerical simulations for a range
of values of the cutoff L. The number of agents is fixed
at N = 101. One of the interesting results in the mi-
nority game is that the mean standard deviation (SD) or
the mean volatility, i.e. the average of SD’s over differ-
ent runs, shows a minimum as a function of m for small
values of s (e.g., s = 2, 3, · · ·) [6,7]. The minimum value
of the mean SD is smaller than for the ‘random’ game
in which agents independently decide by tossing a coin
[6,7]: the system has thereby managed to self-organize it-
self into a state which maximizes the number of satisfied
agents in the community. This minimum has been ex-
plained by invoking the idea that the effects of the crowd
of agents using the best strategy can become counter-
balanced by the effects of the anticrowd of agents using
the corresponding anti-correlated strategy [8,10].
Figure 1 shows the standard deviation (SD) and the
mean attendance (inset) for s = 2 as a function of m,
with cutoff L = 48; this represents a small deviation
from the minority game (L = 50). For each value of m,
32 runs were carried out using different random initial
conditions. Each run corresponds to a total of 10000
turns. It is clear that there still exists a minimum in the
mean SD at around m = 5, a feature analogous to the
minority game result [6,7]. For small m, the SD is large
since the strategy space is small. For large m, the mean
SD approaches the random coin-toss limit of σ =
√
N/2.
For small m, the spread in the mean attendance is larger.
For large m, the mean attendance is slightly larger than
the cutoff and the spread in the mean attendance is small.
It should be noted that the averaged mean attendance
for L = 48 is lower than that in the minority game with
L = 50, indicating the adaptation of the population to
the lower cutoff value: this occurs despite the fact that
the cutoff L is unknown to the agents.
Figure 2 shows the SD and mean attendance for s = 2
and cutoff L = 40. In general, the SD’s in the 32 runs
spread over a much larger range of values than in the case
with L = 48. For the minority game, the SD’s for m =
2, 3 are all above the value corresponding to the random
coin-toss limit. For L = 40, however, the SD’s at m = 3
take on values below the coin-toss limit. An interesting
feature in Fig. 2 is the tendency of having small SD’s in
some runs for all values ofm. A minimum in the averaged
SD exists at a smaller value of m (i.e. m ≈ 3) than for
L = 48. The values of the mean attendance at each
value of m also tend to spread over a larger range than
for L = 48. The averaged mean attendance is lower than
for L = 48, demonstrating once more the adaptation of
the population to the (unknown) cutoff.
As the cutoff L is further reduced, a new feature arises:
the results for the SD and mean attendance show the
formation of two separate groups. One group consists
of large SD’s with magnitudes similar to the minority
game, while the other group consists of small SD’s. Fig-
ure 3 shows the results for L = 30. For each value of m,
the upper SD branch is broad while the lower branch is
narrow. The lower branch has a small mean SD (SD < 1)
and does not vary much with m. If we take an average
over the two branches to obtain a mean SD as in the mi-
nority game, the result is that the minimum in the mean
SD gradually shifts to lower values of m as the cutoff is
lowered. However, such an average may be misleading
as the two branches actually correspond to two different
types of outcomes (i.e. trajectories) of the game. Taken
together with the previous results for L = 48 and 40, the
gradual splitting into two branches of both the SD and
mean attendance distributions is clearly shown as L de-
creases. From this perspective, the minority game with
L = N/2 corresponds to the special case in which the
two branches merge together to form a rather symmetri-
cal distribution.
The formation of a branch with a steady mean atten-
dance together with a corresponding small SD, for small
values of s, can be understood qualitatively as follows.
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For small s, the chance for an agent to have picked s
strategies with the same response to a particular m-bit
history string, is not negligible. Suppose that the re-
cent string of outcomes is · · · 111111, representing a series
of ‘overcrowded’ attendances. Let N ′ be the number of
agents who only have strategies with the decision to at-
tend the bar when faced with an m-bit history consisting
of just 1’s. If N ′ > L, these agents will lose, but they will
keep attending since they have no alternative strategies.
The agents who decide not to attend, i.e. those having
strategies with the decision to stay given the m-bit his-
tory of 1’s, will stay away and win. The mean attendance
is hence approximately N ′ and the corresponding SD is
small. The series of outcomes · · · 111111111 · · · thus cor-
responds to an attractor of the dynamics for N ′ > L.
If N ′ < L, the N ′ agents will attend when faced with
an m-bit history of 1’s. Depending on the decisions of
the other (N − N ′) agents, the next outcome can ei-
ther be ‘overcrowded’ or ‘undercrowded’, with a higher
chance of overcrowding for N ′
<∼ L. Therefore, the se-
ries · · · 111111 · · · with all 1’s is no longer an attractor:
the series of outcomes now consists of 0’s and 1’s. The
mean attendance will be larger in this case with a larger
spread. The 0’s and 1’s in the time series lead to a larger
mean SD as the outcomes make the game look more like
the minority game. For N ′
<∼ L, the mean attendance
will be higher than the cutoff as there will be more ‘over-
crowded’ attendances than ‘undercrowded’ attendances.
For fixed N , the splitting into two branches appears in
the regime of intermediate L where the situations N ′ < L
and N ′ > L occur with comparable probabilities. For
s = 2, there will be about N/4 agents picking two strate-
gies with the same response to a given history on the
average. However, in each run there will be fluctuations
around this mean number. The game with L = 30 and
N = 101 represents the situation in which N ′ < L and
N ′ > L may arise for different runs, and hence leads to
the formation of the two branches in the mean atten-
dance and SD. If we further reduce the cutoff, more runs
corresponding to N ′ > L (i.e. the lower branch) occur.
It has recently been argued that the real history time-
series, and hence the memory, is irrelevant in the minor-
ity game [11]. If the real m-bit history fed to the agents
is replaced by a random m-bit string, then the standard
deviation of the attendance at one of the rooms, say 0, is
essentially unchanged [11]. However, replacing the real
history by a random one in the present system does not
reproduce the results in Fig. 3 for L = 30. Both the
spreads and values for the upper-branch of the SD and
mean attendance differ between the random and real-
history versions. More importantly, the lower branch is
completely absent in the random-history version. This is
because the lower branch depends crucially for its ex-
istence on non-local time correlations in the real his-
tory time-series (e.g. · · · 11111 · · ·). Our findings there-
fore demonstrate the possible dangers of replacing the
true history by a random one when evaluating dynam-
ical properties of such complex adaptive systems. We
note in passing that even in the basic minority game with
L = N/2, correlations do arise in the real history time-
series [7,14].
Figure 4 shows the mean attendance for L = 70 and
s = 2. From the definition of the game, games with cutoff
L′ ≡ N−L are related to games with cutoff L in that the
mean attendance in the game with L′ can be found from
the mean population of agents not attending the room
in a game with L. It is, therefore, sufficient to study the
range of values with L ≤ N/2. Comparing the results
in Fig. 3 (L = 30) with those in Fig. 4 (L′ = 70), the
symmetry between games with L′ and L is clearly shown.
Figures 5 and 6 show results with a larger value of s
(s = 5) for the cases of L = 40 and 30, respectively. For
L = 40, the minimum in the mean SD can clearly be
seen at m = 5. For L = 30 the minimum, although not
as sharp as for larger values of L, is at m = 4: for larger
m, the SD’s start to spread out and show the tendency
to distribute into two groups. Comparing the results at
cutoff L = 30 for s = 2 (Fig. 3) and s = 5 (Fig. 6), the
formation of the two branches is much more pronounced
for small s. This is consistent with our argument above
since the chance that an agent picks s strategies with the
same response to a particular m-bit history is smaller
for larger values of s. Hence, having L = 30 and s =
5 corresponds to the case with N ′ ≪ L: the resulting
behavior is hence similar to a minority game, with the
exception that some runs have smaller SD’s. It should
also be noted from the results for both s = 2 and s = 5
that the minimum in the mean SD gradually shifts to a
lower value of m as the cutoff is reduced.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A generalized version of the minority game with ar-
bitrary cutoff L was proposed and studied. Features in
the mean attendance and standard deviation can be quite
different from the basic minority game as the cutoff shifts
away from N/2. In particular, the mean attendances in
different runs tend to divide into two groups. The cor-
responding standard deviations for these two groups are
very different. These features are not reproduced if the
agents are fed a random history, thereby demonstrating
the importance of dynamical feedback and hence memory
in this system.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: The standard deviation (SD) and mean atten-
dance (inset) as a function of the memory m for N = 101
agents, s = 2 strategies per agent and bar cutoff L = 48.
For each value of m, data from 32 different runs are
shown.
Figure 2: Same as in Figure 1 for N = 101, s = 2 and
L = 40.
Figure 3: Same as in Figure 1 for N = 101, s = 2 and
L = 30.
Figure 4: Same as in Figure 1 for N = 101, s = 2 and
L = 70. Note the relationship between the games with
L = 30 (Figure 3) and L = 70.
Figure 5: The standard deviation and mean attendance
(inset) as a function of m for N = 101, s = 5 and cutoff
L = 40. For each value of m, data from 32 different runs
are shown.
Figure 6: Same as in Figure 5 for N = 101, s = 5 and
L = 30.
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